Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon Paperback – April 1, 2000

The book presents mostly the British side of battle, but the writing is vivid, compelling, even moving at times. The author makes it plain that the British side is more favored in his book simply because the British left more and better preserved records than the other sides. It is an excellent primer on the ground level tactics and techniques, not the more general narrative about grand strategy usually found in military history. If you want to know the HOW of Napoleonic fighting, this is your book. If you want a grand narrative of the overall reasons WHY it all happened, buy David Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon.

Amazing book! I purchased this book to try to understand more about battle during the napoleonic wars and this book was not a disappointment. I got so much more than I was looking for, including a breakdown of the different positions as well as what each did to support the others. There were some great insightful descriptions of what life within the army actually looked like. I'm very pleased I found this book.

Rory Muir’s Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon explores the various aspects of battlefield engagement that characterized the period. The book considers the psychology of men at war rather than offering a grand strategic study. Muir has written extensively on the Napoleonic Wars, and has authored several other books on the subject such as Wellington: Waterloo and the Fortunes of Peace 1814-1852, Salamanca, 1812, and Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815. He is currently a member of the University of Adelaide history department in Australia.Muir’s opening and concluding chapters examine the experience of soldiers on campaign both prior to and after battle respectively. Muir notes that for most soldiers fighting occurred rarely, while most of the time, in contrast to battle’s excitement and horror, campaigning soldiers suffered monotony and the anticipation of combat. He remarks, “Battle added an element of excitement, glamour, and purpose to a soldier’s life; it was the culmination of the campaign, and the chance to prove the man, the unit, and the army.” Muir’s chapter on the aftermath of battle explicates events such as the capture of prisoners and the succor provided to wounded soldiers after the fighting. He notes that typhus and gangrene proved greater killers than even the original wounds that brought men to the field hospital. The hospitals themselves, given the medical limitations of the day, often exacerbated the problems by spreading the diseases. Muir appropriately addresses the devastating effects of these sicknesses on the soldiers, “The dead were as likely to cause disease at the wounded, but there were no resources for anything better than crude mass graves for all but a favored few.”Muir considers the roles of the various arms in the Napoleonic Wars. These chapters provide a detailed description of the equipment, tactics, and deployments of each arm. Muir begins with artillery, noting, “Artillery was the smallest of the three arms which comprised the bulk of the Napoleonic army, and it was something of a poor relation compared to fashionable regiments of cavalry and infantry.” Those serving in artillery suffered a lack of prestige compared to those in the other arms since it attracted more technically minded and often middle-class officers. Napoleon, himself an artilleryman, had frequently tried to increase the proportion of guns in his army to the number of men overall. However, the fact that his army continued to grow larger over time meant that army’s artillery units rarely achieved the numbers he desired. Muir relates the importance of artillery on the battlefield, not simply as a means to inflict casualties, but also as an important tool in demoralizing and undermining the enemy’s cohesion in battle.Muir examines infantry in its various roles, from skirmishers to infantry of the line. The book closely explores the organization of infantry units, but also the performance and expectations while they were engaged in heavy combat. Muir contends that light infantry, acting in their role as skirmishers, played a similar role to artillery. On the battlefield they were expected “to begin to wear down the physical and psychological strength of the enemy, preparing the way for the decisive attack.” Line infantry frequently proved the decisive factor on the battlefield, as it was often used to deliver the crushing final blow. Muir also details the many problems that occurred during battle such as the inaccuracy of muskets, running out of ammunition, inexperienced conscripts, and too few officers. He also affirms the necessity of drilling in order to create an effective fighting unit. “Wellington’s success in the Peninsula owed much to the years 1803-1805 when most of the British army was concentrated at home and was able to train without the disruption of frequent overseas expeditions.”Cavalry likewise played an important part in battle, and Muir reviews the various types of mounted units. The heavy cavalry, the cuirassiers, wore heavy armor since their sole role during an engagement was to charge the enemy. Although medium cavalry served various roles, Muir maintains that light cavalry was by far the most common as it proved the most flexible in its duties, such as skirmishing, patrolling, and screening the army as it moved. Muir considers the fact that cavalry tended to inflict less lethal wounds than the other branches, “for most cavalrymen were preoccupied with controlling their horses and defending themselves, rather than ensuring that they struck home.” Still, Muir contends that inflicting casualties was not cavalry’s most important function. Rather, cavalry’s main employment on the battlefield was to break the enemy unit’s cohesion and sap its soldiers’ morale. Muir also presents cavalry engagements with opposing cavalry as well as with infantry. The ability of foot soldiers to form squares and ward off cavalry attacks proved a critically important tactic in Napoleonic warfare, though it often left the infantry exposed to enemy artillery fire or an attack from enemy infantry. In any case, cavalry often proved powerless against well-disciplined infantry. “Cavalry was a powerful but fragile weapon which needed an extraordinary mixture of caution and daring in its use.”Muir explores several more topics in the book, including the role of generals, staff officers, regimental officers, morale, and attitudes toward battle. Each of these factors contributed to defeat or victory in battle, and Muir competently explains the interactions between them. Commanding generals bore total responsibility for the fate of their armies, and planning and preparation for battle was critical. Muir mentions, “In a set-piece battle the general had usually done his most important work by the time the first shot was fired.” Subordinate commanders and staff officer implemented the general’s orders during the battle, each performing their specific duties in such a way as to conform to the general’s overall plan. However, plans did not always work out as intended. Officers on the battlefield could misinterpret orders or prove overly cautious in implementing them. Sometimes disagreements between officers could contribute to battlefield problems as well. Muir remarks, “Napoleon’s marshals are famous for their feuds and rivalry, and though many of the stories have grown in the telling, there is no doubt this sometimes influenced their operations.” Morale played a critical role in battle as well. Muir argues that Napoleonic armies did not so much seek to kill large numbers of soldiers within the enemy army so much as break the army and see it dissolve into a rout. Therefore, officers sought to maintain high spirits in their units. Men with low morale could easily despair, leading the unit to cohesion loss.Muir observes in his preface that comparatively little has been written on the experience of combat during the Napoleonic Wars, despite the massive literature that exists on the wars broadly. He mentions the works of John Keegan and Paddy Griffith, historians that first sought to present military history in human terms and acknowledges the field’s debt to them. Further, he comments that the two primarily focused on the British experience when writing their works on the Napoleonic period, noting the scarcity of sources on the subject recorded in other languages. Muir offers this as an explanation for his own focus on the British army, though the book does present several accounts from the perspective of French officers and men. Indeed, the bulk of this work examines the British and French experience of battle, while only occasionally providing accounts from other belligerents during the conflict.Muir presents a bibliographic essay at the end of the work in which he states his reasons for basing his research on previously published first-hand accounts. He asserts that he found little in archives that could contribute to the book, though occasionally he was able to utilize some sources such as the correspondence of one of Wellington’s staff officers. Instead, Muir liberally includes passages from various published accounts. These passages frequently offer a sense of immediacy and intimacy into the lives of Napoleonic soldiers. For instance, British Captain Thomas Brotherton’s heart-breaking account illustrates the obstinacy of Captain Knipe, “a very fine fellow” who argued that the best way to charge artillery was head on. At the Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro, Knipe did just that, and was mortally wounded. Even as he died the next day, Brotherton relates, he still argued that his tactic was correct. Another passage, written by one Captain Seymour (first name not given), offered the frustration that often-accompanied men in combat. During the Battle of Waterloo, Seymour, a staff officer, had been dispatched to the Duke of Cumberland. The duke’s Hussars were withdrawing without orders to the rear. Seymour relayed the order for the cavalry to halt and resume its place in the line, though Cumberland repeatedly refused and cited the fact that his men were all volunteers. When Seymour relayed new orders to position the Hussars behind the line, Cumberland still ignored him and continued to the rear.Rory Muir’s Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon is a fine exploration of men in combat during the Napoleonic period. With its strong reliance on memoirs and first-person accounts, the book offers a strong sense of the various factors that shaped battlefield experience, such as command, weapons, morale, and attitudes. The book does suffer from its lack of a broader international perspective. A greater examination into the Prussian, Austrian, Russian, and other armies would have been welcome. Still, given its scope, Muir’s work is a worthy addition to the literature of the Napoleonic Wars and an essential perspective on combat in general.

I always read these reviews before buying, and I have a great deal of respect for the reviewers, and was hesitant to buy this book after reading the uneven reviews. However, with my expectations and experience level being far lower than the Grognards (I read it to get more insight on the ACW and as a foil to Paddy Griffith), I decided to buy it.It turned out to be an interesting and entertaining read, and I was well pleased. So, I would recommend it to those only slightly familiar with Napoleonic military history, and those who know more will just have to take their chances.

Awesome detail oriented lots of first hand accountsCouldn't put it down

I truly enjoyed it but would have liked some stories ig what happened to some of the less famous Austrian, French, Prussian or even Russian officers and soldiers.

This book fulfils the title. Not only are there clear accounts of the manner of war in the Napoleonic era, these are enhanced by personal accounts of life and battle, word illustrated by specific actions. An essential book for students of the period, especially those with military speciality. But it.

This is a good book on Napoleonic warfare, and as the author says in his forward, a kind of expansion on John Keegan’s “Face of Battle” section on Waterloo.One limit, which the author acknowledges, is that like Keegan’s book, it’s focus is mainly on British experiences. This is because, evidently, the British wrote a great deal about their experiences in the Peninsular Campaigns, while the French and other participants did not so much, and/or accounts are not available. I don’t know how true this is, but it is disappointing. The British experience fighting France in Spain differed in many ways from warfare elsewhere on the continent. While the book contains some other accounts here and there, and of course also discusses Waterloo, this limits it’s value somewhat, and why I gave it 4 rather than 5 stars.Otherwise though, it is very good. The author writes clearly and is very knowledgeable. His occasional digressions into controversies about events is not distracting, but rather interesting and illuminating, as are the footnotes.

This excellent book examines exactly what it says in the title - tactics and battle experience - and does it extremely well. It is a terrific book - erudite and exhaustively researched; the author has a thorough command of the sources and literature and his analysis is penetrating and always well argued. This scholarly work is certainly not a book for someone new to the subject - or who wants a description of specific battles or who needs lots of diagrams (although these would not have gone amiss) - but is an invaluable treatment of a whole range of issues and questions which those keen on the subject - in my case as a wargamer - are interested in. It destroys many simple myths - for example about line versus column and givers a convincing analysis of why - and how - battles were won and lost. There's also plenty of life breathed into the discussioin - extracts from memoirs, letters, diaries illustrating the realities of combat. Unreservedly recommended.

I liked the analysis of tactics by arm, especially light infantry.But the book doesn't really add much to your basic knowledge of the era.

very complete and it answered a lot of my questions, for me, one of the best on the subject of the living conditions of the soldier.

Junto con Imperial Bayonets de Nafziger, quizas los dos mejores titulos para conocer el funcionamiento y tacticas de los ejercitos del periodo napolonico, un estudio basado en cartas, manuales escritos de la epoca, lejos de las grandes figuras de la época y de los tópicos en los que han caido la mayoria de los demas textos que tratan el tema. (Recomiendo la introducción de Nafziger en Imperial Bayonets)

As a long time war-gamer I am notorious for changing the rules that are published an commonly used on the basis that they are unrealistic. I saw that Peter Mobrey quotes this book in his very detailed rules for the Napoleonic war game, so I thought they would be worth reading. The book is very readable , using extensive contemporary writings to illustrate the points being made. It is a comprehensive survey of the various roles in the armies and the elements contributing to their operation, including insights into what worked and what was less successful. I found that indeed most rules do seem to feel that war games armies are composed of supermen able to continue in the face of insurmountable odds in ways that are not borne out by historic accounts. I have learnt a lot, thoroughly enjoyed reading the book, and can recommend it without hesitation.